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Abstract
The control structure over money and real assets is considered in
the process of cost innovation. The work here contrasts with the …rst
part of this paper where the emphasis was on the physical aspects
of innovation. Here the emphasis is primarily on the money supply
aspects of innovation. We conclude with observations on evaluation
and the locus of control in the process of innovation.
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1

Finance and Innovation

The speci…c “value-added” to the topics of innovation, control, and ownership attempted here is to start to bridge the mathematical gap between
general equilibrium theory and Schumpeter’s writings on innovation. In the

2

past twenty to thirty years there have been considerable writing and empirical work on innovation and the economic and behavioral questions it raises,
see for example Arthur [2] , Dosi et al. [8], Bechtel et al. [5], Baumol [4],
Lamoreaux and Sololo¤ [10], Day [6], Eliasson and Wihlborg [7], Nelson [11],
Nelson and Winter [12], Shubik [13] and in particular the essay of Day. The
work here is aimed at being complementary with these but aimed speci…cally at trying to characterize mathematically via a dynamic programming
formulation of strategic market games the monetary aspects of innovation
eventually including ownership, …nancial control, and coordination features
of a market economy.

1.1

Physical and …nancial assets, innovation and equilibrium?

This paper is addressed speci…cally to cost innovation and the breaking of the
circular ‡ow of funds. It considers some of the problems of the interaction
between ownership and control. Although written to stand alone, it is based
directly on two essays, one dealing with equilibrium in a closed monetary
economy without innovation [9] and the other concerned with the physical
good aspects of innovation in a Robinson Crusoe Economy [14]. In Section 3
the basic structure of the monetary economy and its dynamic equilibria are
noted. In particular the role of the money interest rate as a control variable
emerges in this setting. The earlier paper [14] is more or less a straightforward
exercise in operations research where in a non-market, non-monetary setting
Robinson Crusoe has to evaluate how to give up physical assets needed for
use in a risky innovation.
In our deconstruction of the investment decision there are …ve features
that merit individual analysis; they are:
1. Equilibrium in a closed monetary economy prior to the knowledge that
innovation is feasible;
2. Innovation in a Robinson Crusoe setting, involving only physical assets;
3. Innovation in a closed monetary economy with only short term assets
investigating the need for the expansion of money and credit;
4. The roles of long term capital assets, locus of control, evaluation and
funding for innovation; and
3

5. The implications of continuing innovation for the distribution of …rm
size and investment.
As has been noted above the …rst two topics have been dealt with in
separate essays. We limit our analysis here to the third item in order to
make explicit the monetary ‡ows and their control. We comment on the last
two features of innovation in Sections 6 and 7, in the expectation that we
and others will deal with these central aspects of control and valuation in a
competitive innovating economy.
One of our goals is to provide some su¢ ciently tractable examples that
can serve as a basis for experimental games.

2

Open and Closed Monetary Economies with
Di¤erent Agents

Prior to constructing a fully closed model, an open model of competitive
innovation is speci…ed. For simplicity we keep the random component of the
innovation process to a minimum. All individuals have an opportunity to
innovate in the …rst period. Each individual’s success depends on the size
of her investment in innovation. After the …rst period there is no further
opportunity to innovate.

2.1

A preliminary open economy model

A formal model of a large group of competitive …rms in a partial equilibrium
monetary economy with innovation is considered. After observations on this
we turn to the basic structure of ownership and …nancial control in a closed
monetary economy.

2.2

An open competitive economy with innovating individual agents

In our earlier essay [14] we studied Robinson Crusoe as an isolated single
innovator with no …nancial or market system existing. We then considered
the market analogue of a small individual, so small that he does not in‡uence
market input or output prices even if he innovates. In a monetary economy
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(unlike that of Crusoe) the …rm can buy the desired inputs needed for innovation or production rather than have them in inventory. Furthermore, in
general it does not produce for self-consumption, but for sales. This is tantamount to saying that the even the owner-controlled …rm may maximize some
function of expected pro…ts. In this model we assume for simplicity that
the input good for production is the same as the output good, and therefore
has the same price. (Another interesting, but quite di¤erent model, would
assume the input good to be di¤erent from the output good).
Consider a continuum of small …rms 2 [0; 1] willing to innovate and
consider that their actions as a whole in‡uence market price. In each of a
countable number of periods n = 1; 2; : : : each …rm begins with a quantity
qn of goods to be sold in a market. The total amount of goods for sale in
period n is
Z
1

qn d :

(1)

We assume that there is a demand function
goods in period n is
pn = (Qn ):

( ) so that the price of the

Qn =

0

(2)

The introduction of a demand function for the price of the produced good
allows us to avoid modeling the consumers and owners, and the circular cash
‡ows. However, the modeling of these features will be important in the closed
models of later sections.
At the start of each period n each …rm holds an amount 0 of cash and
has as goods-in-process qn : The goods are sold in the market at the start of
the period at the price pn = (Qn ): Each …rm borrows an amount bn at
the …xed interest rate
0 from a central bank to …nance production. The
loan bn enables the …rm to buy an amount of input in = bn =pn . The loan is
short-term and must be paid back with interest at the end of the period.
All …rms begin in period 1 with the same production function f1 : [0; 1) 7!
[0; 1), which is assumed to be concave, increasing, and to satisfy f1 (0) = 0.
An input in by a …rm at period n with production function f1 results in
the production of goods qn+1 = f1 (in ) to be sold in the following period.
If a …rm wishes to innovate it must seek out a long-term loan c to
purchase an amount of input goods j = c =pn to use in innovation. The
…rm must service the long-term loan at c per period where is the longterm rate of interest. The servicing of the long-term loan is deducted from
pro…ts in each period. In the models of this paper, it is assumed that the
5

decision to innovate is made at the beginning of period 1 and that there is
no opportunity to innovate at later stages of the game. (In Part 3 we will
consider models which allow for repeated attempts at innovation.)
A successful innovation attempt results in an improved production function f2 : [0; 1) 7! [0; 1) with the same properties as f1 and such that
f2 (i) f1 (i) for all inputs i 0 and with strict inequality holding for some
values of i. The probability of a successful innovation is an increasing function
(j) of the amount j of goods invested. The probability of failure is 1
(j)
and, if failure occurs in the attempt, the …rm must operate thereafter with
the original production function f1 .
The (net) pro…t n of …rm in period n is the income from its sales in
the period minus its interest payments:
n

= pn qn

(1 + )bn

c :

(3)

The objective of the …rm is to maximize the expected value of its total
discounted pro…ts, namely
1
X
n=1

n 1

1
1+

n:

(4)

There are limits on the size of both the short-term and the long-term loans
obtained by a …rm . There is a …xed bound E 0 on the size of the longterm loan c . The limit on the short-term loan bn is set at (pn qn
c )=(1+ )
in order to assure that the …rm is able to pay its debts and avoid bankruptcy.
In seeking a type symmetric equilibrium for this economy, we assume
that all …rms begin in period 1 with the same quantity q > 0 of goods-inprocess, make the same bid b for input goods for production, and invest the
same amount c in attempting to innovate. At the beginning of period 2,
there will be two types of …rms, those called type 1 which have failed in the
attempt and must continue with the production function f1 and those called
type 2 which have succeeded and henceforth have the improved production
function f2 . There will be a fraction " = (c=p1 ) of …rms of type 2 and
"=1 "=1
(c=p1 ) of type 1 in all future periods.
In order to obtain a Bellman equation for the value of this game to a …rm,
we will …rst consider the values for the two types in a period n 2 and then
reason by backward induction to get the equation starting at the beginning.
So suppose that at the beginning of some period after the …rst, type 1
…rms each have goods q1 and type 2 …rms have goods q2 . The total quantity
6

of goods for sale is then
(5)

Q = "q1 + "q2 ;

at the price p = (Q). The Bellman equation for a …rm of type k can be
written, for k = 1; 2, as
1
Wk (~
qk ; p~; c) ;
1+
0 bk (pqk
c)=(1+ )
(6)
where q~k = fk (bk =p) is the quantity of goods held by the …rm in the next
~ = "~
period and p~ is the price of goods in the next period. Thus Q
q1 + "~
q2 is
~
the quantity of goods for sale in the next period and p~ = (Q).
The cost c to each …rm for its long-term loan is the same in every
period. So, if we set Wk (qk ; p) = Wk (qk ; p; 0), it is easy to see that
Wk (qk ; p; c) =

pqk

sup

bk (1 + )

Wk (qk ; p; c) = Wk (qk ; p)

c+

(1 +

)c

(7)

and also that
Wk (qk ; p) =

sup
0 bk (pqk

pqk

bk (1 + ) +

c)=(1+ )

1
Wk (~
qk ; p~) :
1+

(8)

Now let W (q; p) be the value function for a …rm starting in period 1 and
facing the decision about how much to invest in innovation as well as in
production. Then the Bellman equation is given by
W (q; p) =

c

(9)

(c=p))W1 (~
q ; p~; c) + (c=p)W2 (~
q ; p~; c)g ;

(10)

sup

[pq

b(1 + )

0 b (pq
c)=(1+ )
0 c E

+

1
f(1
1+

where p is the price of goods in period 1, q~ = f1 (b=p) is the amount of goods
held by the …rm at the beginning of period 2 and p~ is the price of goods in
period 2. In a type-symmetric equilibrium, all …rms will begin period 2 with
~ = q~ is also the total quantity of goods, and p~ = (Q).
~
the same q~. Thus Q
For the open model of this section we do not describe consumer behavior
beyond the implicit behavior given in the demand function. Furthermore we
are not concerned with closure on the monetary ‡ows that are required of a
closed model. These are addressed in Sections 5 and 6. Here the dividends
that the …rm pays out disappear into a black box, as do the earnings of the
central bank.
7

2.2.1

Convergence to stationary equilibrium after innovation

By a stationary equilibrium is meant a Nash equilibrium in which bids, prices
and the quantity of goods produced remain constant. After the initial shock
of innovation in the …rst period, the economy in our model always has a …xed
fraction " of …rms with production function f1 and the remaining fraction "
with production function f2 . All …rms have the same long-term debt of c 0,
which requires a payment of c in every period. Under some additional
assumptions, there is for such an economy a unique stationary equilibrium. It
is rarely the case that the economy is in stationary equilibrium immediately
or even soon after the innovation stage, but there is, in some generality,
convergence to stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches
in…nity.
In this section we assume that the production functions are strictly concave, continuously di¤erentiable, and that for k = 1; 2
fk (0) = 0; fk0 (0) = 1; lim fk0 (x) = 0:
x!1

(11)

We also assume that the demand function is continuous, decreasing with
…nite positive values, and that prices approach 1 or 0 as the quantity of
goods approaches 0 or 1 respectively; that is,
lim

Q!0

(Q) = 1; lim

Q!1

(Q) = 0:

Finally, we also now allow for the possibility that the pro…t
of a …rm
may be negative in some periods. This means that the bid bk of a …rm may
exceed the limit (pqk
c)=(1 + ) in some periods.
Consider the Bellman equation (8) above and, for k = 1; 2, let
k (bk )

= pqk

(1 + )bk +

1
Wk (fk (bk =p); p~):
1+

Recall that q~k = fk (bk =p), so k (bk ) is the expression inside the supremum
in (8). Standard arguments show that
@Wk
(qk ; p) = p:
@qk
Consequently the Euler equations take the form
0
k (bk )

=

(1 + ) +

1
1+
8

1 0
f (bk =p) p~ = 0:
p k

This holds if and only if
fk0 (bk =p) = (1 + )2

p
:
p~

(12)

In stationary equilibrium there will be a …xed price p for goods so that
p = p~ = p and
fk0 (bk =p) = (1 + )2 ; k = 1; 2:
The input of type k …rms is ik = (fk0 ) 1 ((1 + )2 ) with output qk = fk (ik ).
The total quantity of goods is then Q = "q1 + "q2 and p = (Q ).
Theorem 1 There is a unique stationary equilibrium with the constant price
p and the constant quantity Q of goods produced. In every period, …rms of
type k, for k = 1; 2, bid bk = p ik , and produce qk .
Proof. The bids bk are the unique solutions to the Euler equations, and an
appropriate transversality condition is trivial because quantities and prices
are constant by stationarity.
Suppose now that the economy begins in period 1 with the fraction " of
…rms of type 1 each holding the quantity q1 > 0 of goods and the fraction
" of …rms holding the quantity q2 > 0 of goods. So the initial quantity of
goods in the economy is Q = "q1 + "q2 and the initial price is p = (Q).
Theorem 2 If, in every period, every …rm chooses its bids so that the Euler
equation (12) is satis…ed, then, as the number of periods approaches in…nity,
the total quantity of goods will approach Q , the price will approach p , and
the bids of type k …rms will approach qk for k = 1; 2.
More brie‡y, the economy converges to its stationary equilibrium as the
number of periods converges to in…nity. The proof is in an appendix.
2.2.2

A simple example for pro…t maximizing …rms

In general, an analytic solution to the innovation model is not possible. This
is, in part, because the innovation stage forces the economy out of stationary
equilibrium. By Theorem 2 the economy will, under reasonable assumptions,
converge to a new stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches
in…nity. In this section we consider a very simple example for which the
convergence takes only one step and an analytic solution is easy.
9

Example 1 Assume that every …rm 2 [0; 1] begins with goods q = q = 2
and the production function
(
2i; 0 i 1;
f1 (i) =
(13)
2; 1 < i:
The total quantity of goods is
Q=

Z

1

q d = 2:

0

The price of output is given by the demand function
(
5 Q; 0 Q 5
(Q) =
0;
Q > 5:
So the initial price is p = 5 2 = 3.
Consider …rst the situation where there is no possibility of innovation. It
is then easy to see that the optimal bid of every …rm for input goods is b = 3,
and each …rm then produces
q = f1 (b=p) = f1 (1) = 2
and earns the pro…t
= pq

(1 + )b = 3 2

(1:05) 3 = 2:85:

Indeed, total goods remain equal to 2 and the price of goods is again 3. The
economy is in stationary equilibrium. Each …rm earns the same pro…t in
every period and receives a total discounted pro…t of
1
X
n=1

1
1+

n 1

= 21 2:85 = 59:85:

(14)

Now suppose that there is the possibility of innovation at stage 1. Assume
that a successful attempt at innovation results in the improved production
function
(
4i; 0 i 1=2;
f2 (i) =
(15)
2; 1=2 < i:
10

Note that the maximum production level remains 2, but e¢ ciency is increased
so that this maximum is attained with an input of 1=2 rather than 1.
Assume that the …rms can obtain long-term loans at interest rate
=:
05 in order to purchase goods to be used in the innovation process. Further
assume that if c units of money are borrowed in order to obtain j = c=p = c=3
units of the input good, then the probability of a successful innovation is
(j) =

c
j
=
:
j+1
c+3

In order to …nd the optimal choice for c, we will …rst calculate, as a function
of c, the value of the game from stage 2 onwards for both the successful and the
unsuccessful …rms. Then we can use backward induction to …nd the optimal
value of c at stage 1.
Even with the possibility of innovation, it remains true that the optimal
bid for goods to input for production is b = p = 3. Thus every …rm begins
stage 2 with goods q = f1 (b=p) = f1 (1) = 2. Total goods for sale are Q = 2
with price p = (Q) = 3.
However, the fraction c=(c + 3) of the …rms are successful and begin stage
2 with the improved production function f2 , while the remaining fraction
3=(c + 3) are unsuccessful and still have the production function f1 . Call
the unsuccessful …rms type 1. These …rms continue to have the optimal bid
b1 = 3 with output f1 (1) = 2. All …rms have the same long-term debt of c.
So the pro…t of type 1 …rms at stage 2 is
1

= pq

(1 + )b1

c=3 2

(1:05) 3

:05c = 2:85

:05c:

The successful …rms, called type 2, have the optimal bid b2 = 3=2 with output
f2 (b2 =p) = f2 (1=2) = 2 and pro…t
2

= pq

(1 + )b2

c=3 2

(1:05) (3=2)

:05c = 4:425

:05c:

Notice that total output remains Q = 2 and thus the price is also constant
at p = 3. The optimal bids remain the same in future periods, namely b1 = 3
for type 1 …rms and b2 = 3=2 for type 2 …rms. Thus pro…ts also remain
constant and the total discounted payo¤s (from stage 2 on) to the two types
as a function of c with q …xed at 2 are
W1 (c) =

1
X
n=1

1
1+

n 1
1

11

= 21

1

= 59:85

1:05c

for type 1, and
W2 (c) =

1
X
n=1

1
1+

n 1
2

= 21

2

= 92:925

1:05c

for type 2. Now we can calculate the value W (2) to a …rm from the beginning
stage when all …rms start at q = 2: This value is
W = W (2) =

sup
0 b

pq
1+

c

[ (b; c)]

;0 c E

where
(b; c) = pq

(1 + )b

Take p = 3; q = 2;
W1 (c); W2 (c) to get

=

c+

1
1+

3
c
W2 (c) +
W1 (c) :
c+3
c+3

= :05; b = 3 and the values calculated above for

(b; c) = (3; c) = 2:85 +

1
1:05

3
c
92:925 +
59:85
c+3
c+3

1:05c:

Di¤erentiate with respect to c to …nd the maximum at c = c = 6:49. (The
bounds above in the formula for W are satis…ed so long as the bound E
imposed on long-term loans is at least 6:49.) So the probability of success is
c =(c + 3) = : 68 and
W = 2:85 +

1
f(:68) 92:925 + (:32) 59:85g
1:05

(1:05) (6:49) = 74:46:

Now 74:46 > 59:85 so that overall expected pro…ts have increased due to
innovation. However, the unsuccessful …rms would have been better o¤ had
they not tried to innovate. Indeed the total discounted pro…t of a type 2 …rm
is just the same as in (14) minus the cost 1:05c of …nancing the attempt.

2.3

A comment on open models

When studying a few …rms or a single industry to answer questions such
as the distribution of …rm size, the need to consider the full feedbacks from
a closed economy is for most purposes both unnecessary and more di¢ cult
12

than partial equilibrium analysis. However in order to appreciate the macroeconomic aspects of the in‡uence of …nancial control and the money supply
it is necessary to consider a closed economy. It is there that the separation
among ownership, management and …nancing …rst appears with clarity and
the meaning of the breaking of the equilibrium circular ‡ow of capital may
be illustrated.

3

The Closed Economy as a Sensing, Evaluating and Control Mechanism

Prior to considering the formal closed models with innovation, several general items that supply context are covered. A detailed sketch of the whole
closed system is presented in Figure 1; it is somewhat simpli…ed in Figure
2 prior to the formal analysis. Figure 1 shows di¤erentiated economic units
with some enforcement and evaluation included. Figure 11 provides an overall description describing how credit evaluation, clearing houses, the banks,
central bank and courts …t into the information and enforcement structure.
Institutional reality has many variations and it is easy to argue with the particular “wiring”presented here. but the purpose of this diagram is to give a
…ngerspitzengefühl or an intuitive feeling of what the many realities look like.
Unlike Figure 2, three additional institutions appear. They are the clearinghouse, the credit evaluation agency (implicitly including the accountants)
and the court house. In much of economic theory expertise is ignored primarily because it is too hard to deal with. In old fashioned securities analysis
and accounting due diligence and expertise is central to applications, but it
is often ignored in much of economic and …nance theory. This is because it
is subsumed in modeling the risky economic instruments and entities being
dealt with as lottery tickets that have already been correctly evaluated. We
follow this extreme approximation because for our prime purpose, which is
consideration of the breaking of the circular ‡ow of capital, even at this level
of abstraction the phenomenon still occurs.
1

Based on unpulished work of Shubik and Smith.

13

Info

Firms

Goods

Credit
Evaluation

Info

Traders

Bids
Consumers
Stock, Commodity
and Goods Markets

Loans
Credits
Goods

Settlement
Adjustment

Payments
Clearing
House
Evaluation

Netting

Court
House

Bank

Evaluation
Central
Bank

Figure 1: The economy with …nance, clearing evaluation and enforcement

3.1

Individual or representative agents?

When there is no uncertainty, models utilizing representative agents and
models with independent agents solved for type-symmetric noncooperative
equilibria (TSNE) give the same equilibrium results. When there is any
exogenous uncertainty present this is no longer generally true. With independent agents uncertainty is not necessarily correlated. However, with a
representative agent, uncertainty is implicitly correlated for all members of
the class. As is indicated below we consider a minimal amount of uncertainty.

14

3.2

On money, credit, banks, and central banks

In institutional fact the de…nition and measurement of the money supply is
di¢ cult at best. The distinctions between money and credit are not always
clear. Here we utilize a ruthless simpli…cation in order to highlight the distinction between money and credit and to be able to stress economic control.
Consider money to be paper gold, or some form of blue chip in which payments are made. Credit is a contract between two entities A and B, in which
individual A delivers money at time t1 in return for an IOU or a promise
from B to repay an amount of money to A at time t2 : An individual may
be a natural person or a legal person such as a …rm, a bill broker, a bank, a
credit granting clearing house or a central bank.
We may consider two ways to vary the money supply. The …rst and
simpler is that the central bank is permitted to print it. Another way to
vary the money supply is to accept the IOU notes of commercial banks as
money. Say they are red chips, in contrast with the central bank’s blue chips.
They are accepted in payment on a 1 : 1 basis with blue chips. A reserve
ratio controls the amount a bank can issue, thus for any k units of red chips
issued, a bank must hold one unit of blue chips.2
As we wish to maintain as high a level of simpli…cation as possible in
order to illustrate the breaking of the circular ‡ow, we select the simpler
structure. The banking system is considered as one and called the central
bank. It has funds above its reserves3 that it can lend and it can pay interest
on deposits.4

4

The Separation of Management and Ownership

The next level of complexity above the single type of agent utilizes two types
of agents: managers of the …rms and stockholder-owners. (In the …rst model
2
The justi…cation for the acceptance of reserve ratio banking is in the dynamics along
with acceptance of …at (see for example, [3]).
3
Central bank reserves in a …at money economy are a creation of law and possibly
economic theology. Mathematically they are just societal rules of the game or an algorithm
stating how the central bank can create money. They specify its strategy set. In actuality
the strategy set is also bounded by political pressures.
4
In general, central banks do not accept deposits from natural persons, but for modeling
simplicity here we permit them to do so.

15

below, there is also a class of saver agents who subsist on the returns from
their bank deposits.) The economy can be interpreted as a fully de…ned
game of strategy where there is a …nite measure of …rms and of stockholderowners whose overall actions will in‡uence prices. By assuming that we limit
the solution to a type symmetric noncooperative equilibrium, all agents of
each type, even though independent, will employ a strategy common to their
type. In illustrating some of the basic aspects of …nancing and control of
innovation, the independent agent models show microeconomic uncertainty
at the innovation stage.

5

A Closed Economy Prior to Innovation: The
Circular Flow of Money Illustrated

The model presented in this section is based on work of Karatzas et al. [9]
without innovation. It will be extended in the next section to a model with
innovation in order to consider the disequilibrium aspects of innovation on
the money supply. Out stress so far has been on non-monetary models of
Crusoe as an innovator, or on open microeconomic models. From here on
the emphasis is on simple closed economies or macroeconomic models.

5.1

A closed economy with producers, consumers, monied
individuals and a central bank

The underlying model is that of a “cash-in-advance” market economy with
a continuum of …rms 2 J = [0; 1] that produce goods all of which must be
put up for sale, and a continuum of stockholder agents 2 I = [0; 1] who own
the …rms and purchase these goods for consumption. The agents hold cash
and bid for goods in each of a countable number of periods n = 1; 2; : : :. The
…rms hold no cash5 and must borrow from a single outside bank to purchase
goods as input for production in every period. The bank is modeled as a
strategic dummy that accepts deposits and o¤ers loans at a …xed interest
rate . In addition to the owner agents, there may be a continuum of saver
agents 2 K = [0; 1], each of whom holds cash, bids in every period to buy
goods for consumption, and subsists entirely on her savings. These agents
5

This re‡ects the payment of the 100% dividend, the timing of which is irrelevant in a
perfect credit rating competitive economy.
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can be thought of as “retirees” or private capitalists.6 Figure 2 shows the
structure of the economy with …rms, owners, savers and a central bank.

Central
Bank

$

Bankers
Firms
$

$

$

Financiers
G

$
G
$
Stockholders
Consumers

Savers
Passive

Figure 2: Who controls what?
The six boxes portray an economy somewhat more complex than our
mathematics deals with, but give an intuitive insight into the spreading out
of ownership and control in a modern enterprise economy. The …rms are in
general corporate, they do not own themselves. They have (at some ultimate
level) natural person stockholders who are also consumers. Directly or indirectly they depend on at least four sets of decisionmakers for debt (and some
equity or options) …nancing. They are the passive savers, the …nanciers, the
commercial banks and the central bank. Without having to elaborate further
it should be evident that in any dynamic setting the coordination problem
is considerable. In the mathematical model below we grossly simplify the
…nancial sector, ignoring the …nanciers, collapsing the commercial banks and
6

In a less Draconian abstraction the di¤erence between retirees and capitalists is not
merely age, but expertise. The role of competent …nancing as a perception and evaluating
device cannot be over stressed.
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central bank into one and having the passive savers save in the aggregate
bank, while the …rms borrow only from this bank.
The situation of the …rms in this model is similar to that of the …rms in
the open model of Section 2. However, the …rms in this …rst closed model
have no opportunity to innovate and carry no long-term debt. Each …rm
begins every period n with goods qn that are to be sold in the market. The
total amount of goods o¤ered for sale is de…ned as in equation (1) by
Z
Qn = qn d :
(16)
bn
Each …rm
also borrows cash bn from a central bank, with 0
(pn qn )=(1 + ) , where pn is the price of the good in period n and > 0 is
the interest rate. There is no demand function in this model and the prices
are formed endogenously as will be explained below.
The …rm spends the cash bn to purchase the amount of goods in = bn =pn
as input for production, and begins the next period with an amount of goods
qn+1 = f (in ):
Here f ( ) is a production function, which satis…es the usual assumptions.
During period n each …rm earns the (net) pro…t
n

= pn qn

(1 + )bn ;

since it must pay back its loan with interest. The goal of the …rm is to
maximize its total discounted pro…ts7
1
X
n=1

n 1

1
1+

n:

In a given period n, the total pro…ts generated by all the …rms, are
Z
n =
nd :
The pro…ts n are distributed to the owner agents in equal shares at the end
of the period.
7

In institutional fact the large …rm has a considerable constituency of customers, employees, the government and others as well as the owners.
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The owner agents are now considered. A typical owner agent holds
money mn at the beginning of each period n. The agent bids an amount
of money an with 0
an
mn + n =(1 + ), which buys him an amount
xn = an =pn of goods for immediate consumption. Any extra money an owner
agent has is deposited and earns interest at rate . The agent begins the next
period with cash
mn+1 = (1 + ) (mn an ) + n :
Each agent

seeks to maximize his total discounted utility
1
X

n 1

u(xn );

n=1

where u is a concave increasing utility function and 0 < < 1 is a given
discount factor.
Also considered is a typical saver agent , who holds mn in cash at the
start of period n. The saver bids an amount cn of cash with 0 cn mn ,
which buys him a quantity yn = cn =pn of goods, and starts the next period
with
mn+1 = (1 + ) (mn cn )
in cash. If v( ) is his utility function, with the same properties as u( ), the
saver agent’s objective is to maximize the total discounted utility
1
X

n 1

v(yn ):

n=1

The total amounts of money bid in period n by the owner agents, the
…rms, and the saver agents, are
Z
Z
Z
A n = an d ;
Bn = bn d
and
cn d ;
n =
respectively. The price pn is formed as the total bid over the total production
pn =

An + Bn +
Qn

n

:

An equilibrium is constructed as follows. Suppose that all owner agents
begin with cash M1A = mA > 0, all saver agents begin with cash M1 = m
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0, and all …rms begin with goods Q1 = q > 0. Thus, the total amount of
cash M1 = M1A + M1 across agents, is equal to
m = mA + m ;
and the proportion of money held by the saver agents is
=

m
m
= A
;
m
m +m

with

0

< 1:

Suppose that the bids of the agents and …rms are
a1 = am;

b1 = bm;

c1 = cm;

that is, proportional to the total amount of cash, so that the price is also
proportional to this amount:
p1 = p(m) =

(a + b + c)m
:
q

Then the pro…t of each …rm is
1

= p1 q

(1 + )b1 = (a + c

b)m;

the cash of each owner agent at the beginning of the next period is
M2A = (1 + ) mA

am +

1;

and the cash held by each saver agent is
M2 = (1 + ) m

cm :

Thus, the total amount of cash held by all agents at the beginning of the
next period is
M2 = M2A + M2 = (1 +

(a + b + c))m = m;

where we have set
=1+
De…ne
r=

(a + b + c):

(1 + )(1

)

:

The following theorem was established in [9].
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(17)

Theorem 3 Suppose that there exists i with f 0 (i ) = (1+ )= . Then there
is an equilibrium for which, in every period: each …rm inputs i , produces
q = f (i ), and bids the amount bn = b Mn ; each owner agent bids an =
a Mn ; and each saver agent bids cn = c Mn . Here
a +b +c = r;

b =

r
q

i ;

c = (1

)

(18)

and Mn = MnA + Mn is the amount of cash held across agents in period n.
Furthermore, in each period n: every owner agent consumes the amount
x = (1 1+ )q
i ; every saver agent consumes the amount y = ( 1+ )q ;
whereas every …rm makes Mn in pro…ts, with
= r (1 + )b .
It is shown in [9] that, in the equilibrium of Theorem 3, the consumption
and total discounted utility of the owner agents are decreasing functions
of , such agents prefer as low an interest rate as possible. Similarly, the
…rms also prefer an interest rate as close to zero as possible, in order to
maximize their pro…ts. But the situation of the saver agents is subtler: under
certain con…gurations of the various parameters of the model (discount factor,
production function, utility function) they prefer as high an interest rate as
possible, whereas under other con…gurations they settle on an interest rate
2 (0; 1) that uniquely maximizes their welfare. Let
=1+

(a + b + c ):

Then money and prices in‡ate (or de‡ate) at rate
in the equilibrium of
Theorem 3. We also have a + b + c = r, so that the Fisher equation
= (1 + ) holds.
Remark 1 By setting = 0 in Theorem 3, we obtain an economy with only
producer …rms and owner-consumer agents.8 We will similarly dispense with
saver agents in the models below. This will be useful in illustrating the basic
problems with the circular ‡ow and money supply with innovation in a simple
context. Also we will take = (1 + ) = 1 so that there is no in‡ation.
8

Of course, the proportion has to be strictly less than one; for otherwise there is no
one to engage in productive activity, own the …rms or receive their pro…ts, and the model
unravels.
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6

Innovation in an Asset Poor Economy: Breaking the Circular Flow

As in the previous models we aggregate all goods in the model of this section
into a single perishable consumable that is utilized in consumption or production or consumed in innovation. There is no capital stock, such as steel
mills. There is no “fat”in the economy, resources for innovation must come
directly out of consumption resources.

6.1

The meaning of an asset poor economy

In actuality a modern economy is rich in real durable assets with a time
pro…le of durables of many ages that are consumed only in production, not
consumption. Gross Domestic Product may be split into consumption and
investment. If we consider around 70% in consumption, then we note that
at market prices the value of real assets such as steel mills, automobile factories, houses, automobiles, machinery, land and other consumer durables are
priced probably between 5 to 10 times the value of consumption. None of
these items are meaningfully placed directly in the utility functions of the
individuals. Furthermore, it is the services of consumer durables that are
ultimately valued and not the durables themselves. This is even truer of
items such as steel mills. In the models considered so far we have not indicated that the presence of this large mass of assets owned by individuals
may be such that the loss or exchange of a small percentage of these assets
while pursuing innovation will hardly change the consumption of the owners
of large amounts of real assets.
In a poor country the amount of available assets relative to consumption will be much smaller than in a rich one. We consider in this section
the extreme simplifying case where innovation must come directly out of
consumption. This makes it easier to be speci…c about the breaking of the
circular ‡ow of capital and the match between real assets and money.
In essence innovation is nothing other than the execution of an idea for a
new process to rearrange and employ existing assets in a di¤erent manner.9
It is a breaking of equilibrium that in a rich country calls for an alternative
use for productive assets but does not directly cut down heavily on current
9

Bankruptcy in a basic way is similar to innovation in the sense that it involves a
nonequilibrium redeployment of assets.
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consumption. In contrast, in an asset poor economy, an immediate sacri…ce
in consumption is called for.

6.2

Innovation in an asset poor economy

We consider a model with a class of identical manufacturers, a class of identical, individual consumers, who also own the …rms, and an outside or central
bank.
One could consider three variants:
1. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central
bank is willing to create new money to make investment loans.
2. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central
bank does not create new money. It is a ‡ow-through institution
3. The stockholders are in control, they dictate corporate policy, thus the
…rms are operationally utility maximizing rather than pro…t maximizing. There are at least two possibilities here that need to be distinguished (a) the central bank is willing to create new money and the
stockholders cannot create their own credit; and (b) the central bank
is unwilling to create new money and the stockholders can create their
own credit.
All three variants are found in a modern economy. The third is the most
representative of …ghts for oligopolistic control of the …rms by individual
stockholders (in partnership or corporate structure) holding large blocks of
stock, while the remaining stockholders are passive, riding coattails or selling.
We do not construct a mathematical model of this case here. The …rst
model serves adequately to illustrate the problems with …nancing and is now
described in detail.
6.2.1

A model with managerial control and central bank lending

As in the model of Section 5.1, there is a continuum of …rms 2 J = [0; 1].
Each …rm begins each period n with goods in process qn to be sold in
the market, and borrows cash bn from the central bank to purchase goods
in = bn =pn as input for production. Each …rm begins in period 1 with no
long term debt, but may borrow an amount of money c from the bank to
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purchase goods j = c =p1 to be used in innovation. The interest on this
long term debt must be paid in every period and the short term loan bn must
be paid back with interest at the end of each period n. In general, the long
term rate
might di¤er from the short term rate, but it is su¢ cient and
simpler to assume that they are equal to a common value
0. In order
that a …rm be able to meet its debt obligations, the bid bn is restricted to lie
in the interval [0; (^
pn qn c )=(1 + )], where p^n is the bank’s estimate of
the price pn in period n. (In a rational expectations equilibrium, p^n = pn .)
The bank may also impose an upper limit E on the long term loan c .
As in the model of Section 2.2, all …rms begin in period 1 with the same
production function f1 and thus a …rm will begin period 2 with goods q2 =
f1 (i1 ). However, a successful innovation results in the improved production
function f2 . Thus in periods after the …rst, there are two types of …rms those of type 1, that failed in the attempt at innovation, and continue with
production function f1 , and the type 2 …rms, that succeeded, and have f2 .
The pro…t n of a …rm in period n is de…ned by formula (3) in Section
2.2, and each …rm seeks to maximize its total discounted pro…ts (4). The
total pro…t in period n of all the …rms is the integral
Z
n =
nd ;
and is paid to the consumer-owners in equal shares at the end of the period,
as is explained below.
Because we will again look for a type symmetric equilibrium, we will
assume that all …rms begin period 1 with the same quantity q1 > 0 of goods,
and we will often omit the superscript below. When all …rms begin in
the same state, make the same bids b1 and c, and earn the same pro…t
(1 + )b1
c, the total pro…t and total goods in period 1
1 = p1 q1
simplify to
Z
Z
Q 1 = q1 d = q1 :
1 =
1 d = 1;

Suppose W is the overall value of the program to a …rm. W1 is the value
after a failed investment, and W2 is the value after a successful investment.
Let (c=p1 ) = (j) be the probability of success when c=p1 = j is invested in
innovation. Then the value functions satisfy the following optimality equations.
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W (q) =

[pq

sup
^
0 b pq
1+
0 c E

+

(1 + )b

c

c

1
1+

c
p

1

W 1 f1

b
p

;c +

c
p

W2 f1

b
;c
p
(19)

where

Wk (q; c) =

sup
0 b

pq

b(1 + )

c+

pq
^
c
(1+ )

1
1+

Wk fk

b
p

;c

(20)

for k = 1; 2:
For simplicity we have suppressed super and subscripts above and will
often do so below as well. In both (19) and (20) the notation p^ is for the
bank’s estimate of the price for goods in the period, whereas p denotes the
price actually formed as will be explained below.
As in Section 2.2 there will be after the …rst period the fraction " = (c=p)
of type 2 …rms that succeeded at innovation and the fraction " = 1 " of
type 1 …rms that failed.
In seeking a type symmetric solution, we will assume that at the beginning of periods n
2 all …rms of type 1(respectively type 2) will hold the
same quantity of goods qn1 (respectively qn2 ) and earn the same pro…t 1n (respectively 2n ) in the period. Thus the total pro…t and totals goods in period
n are given by
1
2
Qn = "qn1 + "qn2 :
n = " n+
n;
In addition to the …rms there is also a continuum of consumer-stockholder
agents 2 I = [0; 1]: As in the model of Section 5.1 each agent begins
every period n with cash mn and bids an 2 [0; mn ] to purchase goods an =pn
for immediate consumption. The agent deposits the excess cash mn an in
the bank and gets back (1 + )(mn an ) at the end of the period.
The accounting pro…t Dn of the bank in period n consists of its earnings
from the loans made to the …rms less the interest paid on the deposits of the
owners. Thus
Z
Z
(21)
Dn =
bn d
(mn an )d + c :
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For this model we assume that the pro…t of the bank, like that of the …rms, is
paid to the owners in equal shares at the end of the period. (This assumption
and a possible alternative are discussed in Section 6.2.3 below.) Thus an
owner agent begins period n + 1 with cash
mn+1 = (1 + )(mn

an ) +

n

(22)

+ Dn :

The value function V for an owner satis…es
V (m) = sup
0 a m

u

a
p

+ V ((1 + )(m

a) + D + )

(23)

where u is a concave, nondecreasing utility function and we have again suppressed super and subscripts.
The price pn in each period n is formed as the ratio of the total cash
bid in the goods market to the total amount of goods for sale. In the type
symmetric case, the prices are given by
p1 =

a1 + b 1 + c
;
q1

pn =

an + "b1n + "b2n
; n
"qn1 + "qn2

2:

If m1 = m, then by (22)
m2 = (1 + )(m
= (1 + )(m

a1 ) + 1 + D1
a1 ) + p1 q1 (1 + )b1

c+

[b1

(m

a1 ) + c]:

Now p1 q1 = a1 + b1 + c. Substitute this into the previous equation and
simplify the result to see that m2 = m + c: A similar calculation shows that
mn = m + c for all n 2. Thus in this model the money supply has an initial
increase because of the long-term loan in the …rst period and then remains
constant.
6.2.2

Stationary equilibrium and the question of convergence

A stationary equilibrium for the economy of the previous section is an equilibrium in which bids, prices, and the quantities of goods and money remain
constant. The economy experiences a shock due to innovation in the …rst
period after which there is always a …xed fraction " of type 1 …rms and " of
type 2 …rms. We cannot expect to have a stationary equilibrium until sometime after the …rst period. Under some additional regularity assumptions,
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there does exist a type symmetric stationary equilibrium for the economy as
it is con…gured after the initial shock.
Assume now that the production functions f1 ; f2 and the utility function
u are strictly concave, continuously di¤erentiable, and that the production
functions satisfy the condition (11) of Section 2.2.1.
Suppose as above that there is a fraction " of type 1 …rms having production function f1 and holding goods q1 , a fraction " of type 2 …rms having
production function f2 and holding goods q2 , and a continuum of consumerowner agents 2 [0; 1] each with cash m. The argument in Section 2.2.1
using Euler equations works here as well to show that in stationary equilibrium each type k …rm will input the quantity ik = (fk ) 1 ((1 + )2 ) and
produce qk = fk (ik ) in every period.
The Euler equation for a consumer-owner takes the form
1 0
u
p

a
p

=

~
1
(1 + ) 0 a
u ( ) = u0
p~
p~
p~

a
~
;
p~

(24)

where (1 + ) = 1 by assumption, and a
~ and p~ are the agent’s bid and the
price in the next period. But in stationary equilibrium a = a
~ and p = p~. So
the only condition on the optimal bid a is that 0 a
m.
Let Q = "q1 + "q2 be the total production when …rms of type k input ik
for k = 1; 2. Now in order to purchase ik , …rms of type k must bid bk = pik .
Thus the price must satisfy
p=

a + "pi1 + "pi2
a + "b1 + "b2
=
;
"q1 + "q2
"q1 + "q2

or equivalently
a
= "(q1 i1 ) + "(q2 i2 );
p
which means that the owner agents consume all the goods produced by the
…rms that are not used by the …rms as input for production of goods for the
next period.
Let p = m=Q so that

and
a =

bk = pik =

m
ik ; k = 1; 2
Q

m
["(q1
Q

i1 ) + "(q2
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i2 )] < m:

Observe also that, for k = 1; 2,
Z ik
qk = fk (ik ) =
fk0 (x) dx fk0 (ik ) ik = (1 + )2 ik > (1 + ) ik :
0

Thus the quantities qk (1 + )ik ; k = 1; 2 are strictly positive. Now the
conditions on the bids bk that
pqk
c
1+

bk
can be rewritten as
c

pqk

m
(qk
Q

(1 + )bk =

(1 + )ik ):

By assumption, the long term debt c cannot exceed the bound E. Thus the
inequality above will hold if
E
m

qk

(1 + )ik
:
Q

Theorem 4 If the ratio E=m is su¢ ciently small, then there is a stationary
equilibrium such that, in every period, each …rm of type k inputs ik , produces
qk = fk (ik ), and bids bk = Qm ik ; each owner consumer agent bids a =
m
["(q1 i1 )+"(q2 i2 )]. Furthermore, in every period, every owner-consumer
Q
agent consumes the amount of goods "(q1 i1 ) + "(q2 i2 ) and every …rm of
type k makes the pro…t k = Qm (qk (1 + )ik ).
Proof. The bids a and bk ; k = 1; 2 satisfy their Euler equations, and the
appropriate transversality condition is trivial because, by stationarity, the
payo¤s are the same in every period.
Recall that Theorem 2 of Section 2.2.1 shows there is convergence to
stationary equilibrium for the open model there. We suspect that an analogous result holds for the closed model of this section. Even if this is true,
convergence may be slow and a general analytic solution to the model with
innovation seems unlikely. Some simple examples for which convergence is
fast are in Section 6.3 below.
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6.2.3

The modeling of central bank pro…ts

In the model of Section 6.2.1, it is assumed that the amount c of long-term
interest is part of the accounting pro…t Dn (de…ned in (21)) of the central
bank and is paid in each period to the consumer-owner agents (see (22)). This
is one of several fairly natural models each with di¤erent …nancial, economic
and political implications. One possibility is to neutralize the money as it
comes in, leaving a de‡ationary trend in place. Other alternatives are for
the bank to subsidize some group of agents with this income, or spend it to
buy resources (such as foreign aid subsidies for purchases in the economy, or
the destruction of government purchases of resources for a foreign war). As
many institutional variants can be de…ned, the choice among them depends
on the questions to be answered and their empirical relevance.
In order to de…ne the minimal viable model we have collapsed …ve banking
functions into a single institution. They are:
1. Financing circulating capital or goods in process;
2. Accepting consumer savings;
3. Making short term consumer loans;
4. Making long term investment banking loans;
5. Varying the money supply.
A more detailed model would use at least three institutions: a central
bank, commercial banks, and investment bankers. Here we have chosen a
model with only three types of agents: the …rms, the consumer-owners, and
a banking system. This seems to be the minimal number necessary to build a
playable game that illustrates the phenomenon of breaking the circular ‡ow
of capital.

6.3

Two simple examples

In this section equilibria are calculated for two very simple examples. In both
examples the production functions f1 and f2 are de…ned by the equations (13)
and (15); that is, they are assumed to be the same as those that were used
for the example of Section 2.2.2. Similarly we assume that =
= :05 as
in that example and take = 1=1:05.
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The …rst example treats a consumer-producer who labors in isolation
to produce goods for his personal consumption and has the opportunity to
innovate. The second example contrasts the …rst with the situation in a
monetary economy with many …rms and owner-consumers.
6.3.1

Robinson Crusoe revisited

Consider …rst the situation of Robinson Crusoe equipped with the production
function f1 and without the opportunity to innovate. Suppose that Crusoe
begins with a quantity of goods q > 0, selects an amount i; 0 i q to put
into production, and consumes the remaining q i resulting in a utility of
u(q i). He then begins the next period with goods q~ = f1 (i) and continues
the game.
Let V1 (q) be the value of this one-person game to Crusoe. It satis…es the
Bellman equation
V1 (q) = sup [u(q

i) + V1 (f1 (i))]:

0 i q

For simplicity we assume that Crusoe is risk neutral with utility function
u(q) = q.
It is not di¢ cult to check that a stationary equilibrium has q = 2 and
i = 1 at every stage of the game. Thus
V1 (2) =

1
X

n 1

u(1) =

n=1

u(1)
=
1
1

1
= 21:
1=1:05

Similarly, if Crusoe begins with the production function f2 , a stationary
equilibrium has q = 2 and i = 1=2 with value
V2 (2) =

1
X

n 1

u(2

1=2) =

n=1

3=2
= 31:5:
1 1=1:05

Next assume that Crusoe begins with q = 2 and the production function
f1 , but has the opportunity to invest a portion of his goods in an attempt
at innovation. Suppose further that the opportunity to innovate can be
represented by a binary lottery ticket that can be obtained by utilizing j =
1=2 units of input material. The ticket is such that with probability 1=2 the
innovation succeeds and Crusoe has the production function f2 thereafter,
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but also with probability 1=2 it fails and Crusoe must continue with f1 . Let
V = V (2) be the value of this new game.
Now Crusoe can reject the investment opportunity and continue with his
original production function f1 thereby earning V1 (2) = 21, or make the
investment and receive in expectation
sup
0 i 1:5

u(1:5

i) +

1
1
V1 (f1 (i)) + V2 (f1 (i))
2
2

:

The optimal choice for the input is again i = 1 and the quantity above equals
u(1=2) +

1
1:05

1
1
V1 (2) + V2 (2)
2
2

=

1
1
+
f21 + 31:5g = 25:5:
2 2:1

Since 25:5 > 21, it pays the non-monetary Crusoe to innovate. A smaller
value for the discount factor , say = : 8, would go against innovation.
We now split Crusoe into two and place him in a monetary economy. The
resource base per capita remains the same but, prior to innovation, Crusoe
is in an economy that uses …at money but has no commercial bank and
in a stationary equilibrium only implicitly needs the services of the central
banks as no more money enters or leaves the economy. This changes with
innovation.
6.3.2

A simple monetary economy

The following is an example of the model with many …rms and consumer
owners that was presented abstractly in Section 6.2.
Let m = 1 be the amount of money held initially by the consumers, and
suppose that the …rms begin with goods q = 2 and the production function
f1 . Assume …rst that the …rms do not attempt to innovate. The optimal
input for the …rms is 1 unit of goods. Thus, if the price of goods is p, the
…rms borrow and then bid b = p thereby obtaining i = b=p = 1 as input in
order to produce q~ = f1 (1) = 2 for the next period. The (short-term) loan
to the …rms is …nanced by the deposit of m a = b of the owner-consumers.
So the owners bid a = m b = m p and
m p+p
m
1
a+b
=
=
= :
p=
q
q
q
2
The economy is in stationary equilibrium and each period the …rms earn the
pro…t
1
1
= pq (1 + )b =
2 1:05
= :475
2
2
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with a total discounted return of
1
X
W1 (2) =

n 1

1
1+

n=1

(25)

= 9:975:

The consumers, like Crusoe in the previous example, are assumed to be risk
neutral with utility function u(q) = q. In each period they receive in utility
u(a=p) = u(1) = 1 with a total discounted utility of
V1 (2) =

1
X

n 1

(26)

u(1) = 21:

n=1

Now suppose that the …rms have the opportunity to innovate. The physical aspects of the economy will be the same as for Crusoe in the previous
example, but prices and money will now play a role.
By investing 1/2 unit of goods, each …rm can, independently of the others, purchase a lottery that with probability 1/2 results in the improved
production function f2 for the …rm, but also with probability 1/2 fails causing the …rm to continue with f1 . The question for the managers of the …rms
is whether they can improve upon the return achievable without making the
attempt at innovation.
To answer this question, assume that the …rms do purchase the lottery.
Suppose that the price of goods in the …rst period is p. The …rms will need
to bid b + c = p + p=2 = 1:5p in order to purchase 1 unit of goods as input
for production and 1/2 unit for the innovation attempt. The short-term loan
of b = p is again …nanced by the consumer-owners who bid a and deposit
m a = b = p as before. However, the bid c = p=2 is …nanced by a long-term
bank loan which must be repaid over the in…nite future in payments of c in
every period. The price of goods in the …rst period is then
p=

m
a+b+c
=
q

p + p=2 + p
1 + p=2
=
:
2
2

So the price is p = 2=3, and b = 2=3; a = 1
the …rst period the pro…t

p = 1=3 = c. The …rms earn in

2
2
2 1:05
3
3
The owner-consumers receive in the …rst period
= pq

(1 + )b

c=

u(a=p) = a=p =
32

1=3
= 1=2:
2=3

:05

1
= :6167:
3

In all subsequent periods the unsuccessful …rms called type 1 with production function f1 bid b1 = p in order to input 1 unit of goods while the
successful …rms called type 2 with production function f2 bid b2 = p=2 in
order to input 1=2. As before these short-term loans are …nanced by the
owner-consumers, who now hold cash m + c = 1 + 1=3 = 4=3. So they
deposit
1
3
1
4=3 a = b1 + b2 = p
2
2
4
Hence, the price in periods after the …rst satis…es
3
4
a + 12 b1 + 21 b2
p + 34 p
= 3 4
= 2=3;
q
2
that is, the price equals 2/3 in every period. (One should not expect constant
prices in general. This example was constructed to make for a simple analysis.) Notice that because of the constant price and the constant derivative
u0 = 1, the Euler equation (24) is satis…ed at every stage.
In periods after the …rst the type 1 …rms have the pro…t
2
1
2
2 1:05
:05
= :6167;
(1 + )b1
c=
1 = pq
3
3
3
type 2 …rms make
2
1
1
(1 + )b2
c=
2 1:05
:05
= :9667;
2 = pq
3
3
3
and owner-consumers receive
5=6
u(a=p) = a=p =
= 5=4:
2=3
The total expected value to a …rm is
( 1
)
1
n 1
n 1
1
1
1X
1
1X
W = W (2) = +
1+
2
1+
2 n=1 1 +
2 n=1 1 +

p=

=:6167 +

1
1:05

1
1
21 :6167 +
21 :9667
2
2

= 16:4507:

Since 16:4507 > 9:975, the innovation lottery is good for the …rms.
The total expected utility for an owner-consumer is
1
X
n 15
1=2 +
= 25:5;
4
n=1

which is greater than 21. So the lottery is good for consumers also.
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6.3.3

Innovation …nanced by a money market

In the economy of Section 6.2.1 as in the example of Section 6.3.2, the attempt
at innovation is …nanced by the bank with an an injection of additional
money into the system. It is also possible to construct examples for which
innovation is …nanced by a money market with loans made to the …rms from
the consumer-owners and the quantity of money remains …xed. We suspect
that there are also examples where there is an equilibrium with innovation
when there are additional funds available from a bank and that innovation
will not occur without such additional funds.

6.4

A comment on monied individuals: Retirees or active capitalists?

In Section 5.1 we considered a model with a class of individuals whose only
asset was government money. Because the solution supported the …at as both
a means of payment and a store of value these individuals were able to live
o¤ their money. In the model of Section 6.2, our main concern being central
bank …nancing, we omitted them for simplicity.
The introduction of a class of agents living o¤ money provides for a basic
reconsideration of the role of …nance in the economy. In particular their
interest in in‡uencing a government set rate of interest may be diametrically
opposed to the desires of the producers.
Is a retired surgeon with $10,000,000 the economic equivalent of a professional money lender with $10,000,000? Almost always the answer is no.
Information, evaluation, expertise, and specialization of the …nancial functions are in essence an evolutionary aspect of the overall body economic.
The essential di¤erence between a merely rich amateur investor and a professional is perception, expertise, knowledge and a network of professional
connections. The professional investor is part of the general sensory system
of the economy dealing in the perception and evaluation of risk in a dynamic
economy. The rich retiree is better o¤ investing indirectly though a professional investor be it a bank, investment bank, or other …nancial professional
unless she has a network of connections of her own that enable her to invest
directly in a family’s or friend’s business.
The remarks above imply that at least we should split the savers in the
model of Section 5.1 into two parts, passive savers and active …nanciers.
The savers deposit only in the commercial banks or pension funds, while the
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…nanciers are involved in evaluation and deal directly with the …rms and the
markets for …rms and their stocks. The consideration of such a model is left
for a future project.

7

Ongoing Innovation Opportunities

In this, Part 2 of our consideration of the …nancing of innovation, we con…ned
our observations to models with randomness only at the initial stage. In
essence we were able to utilize a modi…cation of two dynamic programming
models with independent agents each facing only one stochastic element at
the start. Even with the piling up of gross simpli…cations the conditions
needed to be able to obtain a stationary state involved an adjustment period
of arbitrarily length. With a random variable each period the turbulence will
increase considerably and the characterization of even the simplest market
with innovation with a random element in each period will lead to a path
dependent distribution of …rm size and stochastically increasing returns of
the variety indicated by Brian Arthur [1]. We intend to pursue the possibility
of an ongoing innovation process in a separate essay.

8

Summary Remarks

Our basic goal was to produce an adequate mathematical model that could
re‡ect mathematically the meaning of Schumpeter’s breaking of the circular
‡ow of capital in a closed economy. There are several other basic features
that static or even dynamic conventional equilibrium models cannot capture:
1. Innovation and comparative statics: Innovation requires an extra process
that utilizes existing resources. This is illustrated here by a comparative
analysis of two economies, one with and the other without innovation
in Sections 6 and 5, respectively.
2. Robinson Crusoe and the parallel worlds of goods and …nance: An
understanding of Robinson Crusoe’s innovation opportunities provides
a clear preliminary way to understand the roles of real resources and
ownership control prior to seeing the strategic decoupling o¤ered by
money and the …nancial system in a complex economy [9].
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3. The problem of convergence to stationary equilibrium even with only
one random event: Under reasonable assumptions the open economy
of Section 2 converges to stationary equilibrium after an initial shock
due to innovation. It remains open whether the same is true for the
closed economy of Section 6. If so, the rate of convergence will no doubt
depend on the speci…c structures of production and consumption.
4. Financing and two way causality: The availability of extra goods may
bring forth a demand for extra money; however the …nancing of innovation may be generated by the availability of extra money or credit.
Thus causality may go in both directions.
5. Bankruptcy as the delimiter of risk: Bankruptcy laws are a logical necessity needed to account for the possibility of failure. If innovation
fails and individuals are bankrupted their remaining resources may be
redistributed to cover in part the contractual obligations. Thus from
the viewpoint of society as a whole the bankruptcy laws are a public good delineating how much the economy as a whole shares in the
outcome from the individual gamble.
By selecting a bankruptcy penalty greater than or equal to the highest marginal utility of money on an equilibrium path and limiting the
amounts that individuals borrow, we can avoid in our models solutions
involving active bankruptcy.
6. The locus of innovation …nance may be public or private: Historically
both private and public resources have been involved in innovation.
Global exploration and then space exploration were heavily government
enterprises to start with and the private sector followed. This is also
true for the internet.
This paper was basically aimed at understanding the nature of the cash
‡ows in innovation. As such we purposely played down the distribution of
power and wealth masking it by extreme aggregation.These factors require a
separate treatment.

9

Appendix: The Proof of Theorem 2

Here the notation and assumptions are those of Section 2, and, in particular,
Section 2.2.1. Consider an economy as in that section with two types of …rm
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at the beginning of a period in which every type 1 …rm holds the quantity of
goods q1 and every type 2 …rm holds the quantity q2 with the total quantity
of goods being Q = "q1 + "q2 .
By equation (3) in Section 2.2.1,
(Q)
;
~
(Q)

f10 (i1 ) = f20 (i2 ) = (1 + )2

~ is the total quantity of goods at the beginning
where ik = bk =p; k = 1; 2 and Q
of the next period. Moreover,
~ = "f1 (i1 ) + "f2 (i2 )
Q
because q~k = fk (ik ) is the quantity of goods held by …rms of type k at the
beginning of the next period.
It follows from our assumptions on f1 and f2 that, for every positive value
of i1 there is a unique positive value of i2 such that f10 (i1 ) = f20 (i2 ). Also this
value of i2 is a continuous, increasing function of i1 and approaches 1 when
i1 does.
Consider now the function
(i1 ) = f10 (i1 )

~ = f 0 (i1 )
(Q)
1

("f1 (i1 ) + "f2 (i2 ))

where i2 has the value described in the previous paragraph. The function
is continuous and decreases from +1 to 0 on [0; +1). Hence, for each
positive Q, there are unique positive numbers i1 = i1 (Q) and i2 = i2 (Q) such
that f10 (i1 (Q)) = f20 (i2 (Q)) and
(i1 (Q)) = f10 (i1 (Q))

("f1 (i1 (Q)) + "f2 (i2 (Q))) = (1 + )2

(Q):

Thus we can de…ne the mapping
from the current value for the total
~
quantity of goods Q to the quantity Q for the next period by
~
(Q) = "f1 (i1 (Q)) + "f2 (i2 (Q)) = Q:
The mapping provides a law of motion for the economy when …rms choose
their bids in agreement with the Euler equations.
Lemma 5 1. The functions i1 (Q); i2 (Q) and
ing functions of Q on (0; 1).
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(Q) are continuous, increas-

2. The function

has a unique …xed point, namely
Q = "f1 (i1 ) + "f2 (i2 )

where ik = (fk ) 1 ((1 + )2 ); k = 1; 2.
3. If 0 < Q < Q , then Q
4. For Q > 0,
of with itself.

n

(Q)

Q ; if Q < Q, then Q

(Q) ! Q as n ! 1, where

n

(Q)

Q.

is the n-fold composition

Proof. 1. The continuity of i1 ; i2 ; follows from the assumed continuity of
f10 ; f20 ; .
To see that i1 is increasing, let 0 < Q1 < Q2 . Then
(i1 (Q1 )) = (1 + )2 (Q1 ) > (1 + )2 (Q2 ) = (i1 (Q2 )):
Since is decreasing, i1 (Q1 ) < i1 (Q2 ). Also i2 (Q) is an increasing function
of i1 (Q). So i2 (Q1 ) < i2 (Q2 ).
Finally, because f1 ; f2 are increasing, we have
(Q1 ) = "f1 (i1 (Q1 )) + "f2 (i2 (Q1 )) < "f1 (i1 (Q2 )) + "f2 (i2 (Q2 )) = (Q2 ):
2. The quantity Q is a …xed point of

means that

(Q) = "f1 (i1 (Q)) + "f2 (i2 (Q)) = Q;
which is equivalent to
(i1 (Q)) = f10 (i1 (Q))

(Q) = (1 + )2

(Q):

This holds if and only if
f10 (i1 (Q)) = (1 + )2 = f20 (i2 (Q));
that is, i1 (Q) = i1 and i2 (Q) = i2 and so Q = "f1 (i1 ) + "f2 (i2 ).
3. Let 0 < Q < Q . By parts 1 and 2, we have
(Q)

(Q ) = Q :

Moreover,
(Q) ="f1 (i1 (Q)) + "f2 (i2 (Q))
(1 + )2 (Q)
= 1
f10 (i1 (Q))
1
( (Q)) = Q:
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The inequality above holds because i1 (Q)
i1 (Q ) = i1 by part 1 of the
0
0
2
theorem and thus f1 (i1 (Q)) f1 (i1 ) = (1 + ) .
The proof for the case when Q < Q is similar.
4. It follows from part 3 that for Q > 0, whether Q Q or Q Q , the
limit
L = lim n (Q)
n

exists and is …nite. Also, by part 1,
(L) = (lim
n

n

is continuous and thus

(Q)) = lim

n+1

n

(Q) = L:

By part 2, L = Q .
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, suppose that the …rms always make
bids in agreement with the Euler equations. Let Qn be the total quantity
of goods in period n. Then by part 4 of the lemma, Qn = n 1 (Q1 ) ! Q .
Also, if pn is the price in period n, then pn = (Qn ) ! (Q ) = p , because
is continuous by assumption. Now let bk;n be the bid of …rms of type k in
period n. Then
pn
pn+1
b
= (fk0 1 ((1 + )2 )) = k :
p

bk;n
=
pn

fk0

1

(1 + )2

So bk;n ! bk , and the proof is complete.
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!

fk0

1

(1 + )2

p
p
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